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Building Intellectual Property Coalitions
for Development
PETER K. YU

INTRODUCTION

In October 2004, Argentina and Brazil introduced an important proposal
to establish a development agenda within WIPO. This proposal “call[ed]
upon WIPO General Assembly to take immediate action in providing for
the incorporation of a ‘Development Agenda’ in the Organization’s work
program” (WIPO 2004). After years of deliberation in the Provisional
Committee on Proposals Related to a WIPO Development Agenda and
the Inter-sessional Intergovernmental Meeting on a Development Agenda
for WIPO, the Development Agenda was finally adopted in October 2007
(WIPO 2007). The adopted agenda includes forty-five recommended
proposals that are grouped into six different thematic clusters: (1) technical assistance and capacity building; (2) norm setting, flexibilities, public policy, and public domain; (3) technology transfer, information and
communication technologies, and access to knowledge; (4) assessment,
evaluation, and impact studies; (5) institutional matters, including mandate and governance; and (6) other issues.
Although the WIPO Development Agenda is key to reforming the current international intellectual property (IP) regime, similar pro-development initiatives have been undertaken in international fora outside of
WIPO. Within the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Doha Development Round of Trade Negotiations (Doha Round) resulted in the adoption of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health
(Doha Declaration) and a protocol to formally amend the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement).
If the amendment is ratified by two-thirds of the WTO membership by
79
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December 2009, the proposed Article 31bis of the TRIPs Agreement will
allow countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity to import
generic versions of on-patent pharmaceuticals.1
At the World Summit on the Information Society, which was held in
phases in Geneva and Tunis, less developed countries—including both
developing and least developed countries2—underscored their concerns
over the widening digital divide between developed and less developed
countries and the global importance of access to information and knowledge (WSIS 2003; 2005). At the World Health Assembly and within the
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health
of the World Health Organization, the lack of access to essential medicines
in less developed countries and the unintended consequences of the TRIPs
Agreement have received growing attention and debate (WHO 2006).
Most recently, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
has provided an authoritative interpretive comment on Article 15(1)(c)
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(1966), which requires each state party to the covenant to “recognize the
right of everyone ... [t]o benefit from the protection of the moral and
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he [or she] is the author” (United Nations 2006). In an
earlier resolution, the Sub-Commission on Human Rights also reminded
governments “of the primacy of human rights obligations over economic
policies and agreements” and the importance of other human rights,
such as the right to food and the right to health (United Nations 2000).
In short, an extensive and wide-ranging array of pro-development
efforts has been undertaken to revamp the international IP regime. A
large number of international fora are involved, and support from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), activist groups, and academics is
abundant. In light of this momentum, less developed countries now have
a rare and unprecedented opportunity to reshape the international IP system in a way that would better advance their interests.
If these countries are to succeed, however, they need to take advantage of the current momentum, better coordinate with other countries
and NGOs, and more actively share with others their experience, knowledge, and best practices. With these goals in mind, this chapter explains
how building IP coalitions for development (IPC4D) can help less developed countries strengthen their collective bargaining position, influence
negotiation outcomes, and promote effective and democratic decision
making in the international IP regime. The chapter then discusses four
coordination strategies that can be used to develop these coalitions. It
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concludes with a discussion of the various challenges confronting the
creation and maintenance of these coalitions.
IP COALITIONS

IPC4D is a concept that can take many different forms—blocs, alliances,
regional integration, or other cooperative arrangement. The resulting
coalitions have several attractive features. By bringing countries together,
the coalitions can achieve leverage that does not exist for each less developed country on its own. If used strategically, they will enable less developed
countries to shape a pro-development agenda, articulate more coherent
positions, or even establish a united negotiating front. The coalitions will
also help less developed countries establish a more powerful voice in the
international debates on public health, IP, and international trade.
Moreover, from the standpoint of international relations, the creation
of IPC4D will help many less developed countries combat the external
pressure that each country will face on a one-to-one basis from the European Communities, the United States, or other powerful trading partners (Bird and Cahoy 2008, 317). With the appropriate arrangements,
these coalitions may even facilitate the transfer of technology from the
haves to the have-nots, targeting a major weakness of the current international IP regime (Yu 2008, 368–69).
If regional coalitions are set up—such as through regional economic
integration; the institution of regional organizations, mutual recognition
systems, or procurement systems; the facilitation of regional cooperation
in research and development; or the creation of regional competition
enforcement mechanisms—there may be additional benefits. As Sisule
Musungu, Susan Villanueva, and Roxana Blasetti (2004, xiv) have noted
in a South Centre study,
[a] regional approach to the use of TRIPS flexibilities will enable similarly
situated countries to address their constraints jointly by drawing on each
others’ expertise and experience and by pooling and sharing resources
and information. This approach has several advantages. First, it creates better policy conditions for addressing the challenges of implementing TRIPS
flexibilities, which can be daunting for each individual country. Second,
a common approach to improve access to essential medicines[, knowledge, information and communication technologies, and other key development resources] will enhance the efforts by developing countries to
pursue common negotiating positions at the WTO and in other multilateral negotiations such as those on a substantive patent law at the …
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WIPO. In addition, a regional approach coincides with the objective of
enhancing South-South cooperation on health and development.
Consequently, if strategically utilized, regional South-South frameworks will significantly help developing countries devise ways by which
national constraints in the use of TRIPS flexibilities can be overcome.

Likewise, two political scientists remind us that “[s]hared historical experiences among states of a particular region develop over time ... and the
cultural affinities which facilitate commerce are more likely with neighbouring peoples than with those from afar” (Coleman and Underhill
1998, 1). It is, therefore, no surprise that Amrita Narlikar (2003, 155)
finds “coalitions that utilize regionalism as a springboard for bargaining
[to] be ... ‘natural coalitions.’”
While IPC4D have many attractive features, building these coalitions
is important for four additional reasons. First, the WTO has dominated
current international IP discussions, and group representation of less
developed countries is particularly deficient in this international trading
body. As Sonia Rolland (2007, 483) recently noted, “[a]lthough the organization operates on a one-country-one-vote basis and on a consensus
mechanism ... developing countries still find themselves in a relatively
marginalized position and experience difficulties in linking their development agenda to multilateral trade negotiations.” Collective bargaining is therefore greatly needed.
Second, there is a rare and unprecedented opportunity for less developed countries to reshape the IP debate. At recent WTO ministerial conferences in Doha, Cancún, and Hong Kong, less developed countries
have built considerable momentum in pushing for reforms that would
recalibrate the balance of the international trading system. Greater collaboration, therefore, would help less developed countries take advantage
of this momentum while protecting the gains they already have obtained
in recent negotiations.
Third, and related to the second, the Doha Round will conclude soon,
and development issues may not feature as prominently in the next round
of WTO negotiations as in the current round. Indeed, without the urgency
created by the 11 September tragedies, the fatalities caused by the 2001
anthrax attacks in the United States, and the United States’ resulting general
interest in working more closely with the less developed world, one has to wonder whether the Doha Round could have been negotiated as far as it has gotten (Amoore, Germain, and Wilkinson 2003, xiii). Thus, if less developed
countries want to continue their success in future rounds of trade negotiations, they need to significantly increase their collective bargaining leverage.
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Finally, the international IP regime has recently expanded to cover
issue areas that are traditionally covered by other international regime or
fora, creating what I have termed the “international intellectual property
regime complex” (Yu 2007c, 13–21).3 As a result of its complexity and fragmentary nature, this conglomerate regime is likely to harm less developed
countries more than it has harmed developed countries (Benvenisti and
Downs 2007). The growing complexities have also upset the existing coalition dynamics between actors and institutions within the international trading system, thus threatening to reduce the gains made by less developed
countries through past coalition-building initiatives (Yu 2007c, 17–18).
COORDINATION STRATEGIES FOR DEVELOPING IPC4D

To help develop IPC4D, this section discusses four different coordination strategies: (1) the initiation of South-South alliances; (2) the facilitation of North-South cooperation; (3) joint participation in the WTO
dispute settlement process; and (4) the development of regional or prodevelopment fora. It also explains the need for, and benefits of, each
strategy. Since these four strategies are not intended to be mutually exclusive, countries seeking to strengthen their bargaining position are encouraged to maximize the impact by using a combination of these strategies.
South-South Alliances

Since the failure of the fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún
(Cancún Ministerial) in 2003, the United States has initiated a divideand-conquer strategy that seeks to reward countries that are willing to
work with the United States while undermining efforts by Brazil, India,
and other G-20 members to establish a united negotiating front for less
developed countries (Yu 2006a, 403). Although the United States had
begun negotiating new bilateral and regional trade agreements before the
failed ministerial conference, these agreements have been increasingly
used as a means to isolate uncooperative less developed countries. As
Robert Zoellick, the former US trade representative, wrote in the Financial Times shortly after the Cancún Ministerial, the United States will
attempt to separate the “can-do” countries from the “won’t-do” countries
and “will move towards free trade with [only] can-do countries” (2003, 23).
This isolation strategy is not new. It was used by the United States to
increase its bargaining leverage during the negotiation of the TRIPs
Agreement. At that time, the United States used section 301 provisions
to isolate major opposition countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, India,
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Japan, Mexico, South Korea, and Thailand (Yu 2004, 413). South Korea,
for example, was threatened with sanctions for inadequate protection
for computer programs, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals as well as in the
areas of copyrights, patents, and trademarks (Watal 2001, 18). Likewise,
the US trade representative included on the Section 301 Priority Watch
List or Watch List half of the ten hardliner countries that refused to
expand the mandate of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(1947) to cover substantive intellectual property issues, namely Argentina,
Brazil, Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia (Drahos 2002, 774).
If less developed countries are to counterbalance the United States’
divide-and-conquer strategy, lest more TRIPs-plus standards be developed at both the multilateral and regional levels, they need to initiate a
combine-and-conquer strategy. Simply put, they need to build more coalitions within the less developed world. A recent successful example was the
development of the G-20 during the Cancún Ministerial. Although its
success was short-lived, the group was instrumental in preventing the
WTO member states from reaching agreement on such issues as investment, competition policy, government procurement, and trade facilitation. Its success eventually led to the premature ending of the ministerial
conference and the Bush administration’s change of focus from multilateral negotiations to bilateral or regional agreements.
Today, there is a tendency to view bilateral or regional agreements
with skepticism, partly as a result of their wide and controversial uses by
the European Communities and the United States to ratchet up global
IP standards. However, it is important to distinguish these North-South
agreements from the more favourable South-South agreements. Bilateral or regional agreements are not always destructive to the international IP regime. Depending on their terms, South-South agreements
may serve as an effective way to build coalitions within the less developed
world. They may also promote multilateralism by fostering common positions among participating countries.
North-South Cooperation

Although the WTO and the international IP regime remain heavily statecentred, the participation of non-state actors (such as multinational corporations and NGOs) and sub-state agents has grown considerably. During the
Cancún Ministerial, “most high-profile [NGOs], such as Greenpeace,
Oxfam, and Public Citizen, explicitly backed the developing countries’
stand and heavily criticized developed countries, in particular the US and
the EU, for a lack of consideration for their poorer trading partners”
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(Cho 2004, 235). While “[s]ome operated as think tanks in supporting the
agenda of developing countries[, o]thers issued statements expressing political support for the demands of the G20” (Hurrell and Narlikar 2006, 424).
In addition, sub-state agents have become increasingly active. As Chris
Alden (2007, 29) has noted with respect to China’s government and business ties in Africa, Chinese provincial and municipal authorities have
undertaken major initiatives to establish formal and informal ties in South
Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, Angola, and Nigeria. In recent years, there has also been an interesting emergence of nonnational systems, such as the adoption of the Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) in October 1999 by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a private not-forprofit corporation in California (Yu 2007a, 88–91).
Thus, instead of focusing on state-to-state relationships, less developed countries need to better understand the importance and challenges
for working with NGOs and sub-state agents and within non-national systems. They also “need to work consistently with US and European political allies to alter the US and European domestic political contexts”
(Shaffer 2004, 479). In doing so, these allies will be able to obtain support
within the domestic deliberative processes in developed countries that
is similar to the support they have already received within their own countries or in the less developed world. Even if these countries are unable to
obtain their desirable policy outcomes through the political processes in
the developed world, their foreign allies may be able to significantly
reduce the political pressure developed countries will exert upon their
less developed counterparts.
To date, there has been significant collaboration between policy makers in less developed countries and NGOs in both developed and less
developed countries. Academics and the media in the North have also
played important roles. For example, academics and their institutions
have helped identify policy choices and negotiating strategies while developing technical capacity in less developed countries. Likewise, less developed countries can increase their leverage and negotiating outcomes if they
are able to “capture … the attention of the mass media in industrial countries and persuade … the media to reframe the issue using a reference
point more favorable to the coalition’s position” (Odell and Sell 2006,
87). As John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos (2000, 576) have noted, “[h]ad
TRIPS been framed as a public health issue, the anxiety of mass publics
in the US and other Western states might have become a factor in destabilizing the consensus that US business elites had built around TRIPS.”
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The WTO Dispute Settlement Process

One of the major features of the WTO is its mandatory dispute settlement process. Although the United States and the European Communities had used the process predominantly in the first few years of the WTO’s
existence, especially when the disputes involved the TRIPs Agreement, less
developed countries have begun to use the process more actively in recent
years (Davey 2005, 17 and 24). While Brazil and India initially used the
process primarily against less powerful WTO member states, such as
Argentina, Turkey, Mexico, Peru, and Poland, they have started to use
the process more aggressively against powerful WTO member states, such
as the European Communities and the United States.
Today, globalization and international trade have deeply affected
domestic policies, and an active participation in the WTO dispute settlement process is of paramount importance to WTO member states. By
participating in this process, countries can help develop WTO jurisprudence in a way that can shape the ongoing negotiations in the areas of
international trade, IP, and even public health. Gregory Shaffer (2004,
470) describes such participation as negotiation “in the shadow of” the
WTO dispute settlement process. As he explains:
Participation in WTO judicial processes is arguably more important than
is participation in analogous judicial processes for shaping law in national
systems. The difficulty of amending or interpreting WTO law through
the WTO political process enhances the impact of WTO jurisprudence.
WTO law requires consensus to modify, resulting in a rigid legislative system, with rule modifications occurring through infrequent negotiating
rounds. Because of the complex bargaining process, rules often are drafted
in a vague manner, thereby delegating de facto power to the WTO dispute
settlement system to effectively make WTO law through interpretation.
As a result of the increased importance of WTO jurisprudence and the
rigidity of the WTO political process, those governments that are able to
participate most actively in the WTO dispute settlement system are bestpositioned to effectively shape the law’s interpretation and application
over time.

Shaffer’s approach makes a lot of sense. After all, there is no indication that
the WTO dispute settlement panels are biased toward stronger protection of IP rights. In the decisions issued thus far, the panellists have focused
narrowly on the language of the TRIPs Agreement, taking into consideration the recognized international rules of interpretation, the context of
the TRIPs negotiations, and the past and subsequent developments of relevant treaties. In Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (2000,
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para. 7.26), the panel even referred favourably to the limitations and public interest safeguards contained in the TRIPs Agreement. As the panel
declared, “[b]oth the goals and the limitations stated in Articles 7 and 8.1
must obviously be borne in mind when [examining the words of the limiting conditions in article 30] as well as those of other provisions of the
TRIPS Agreement which indicate its object and purposes.”
Moreover, as I have noted elsewhere in the context of the United States’
ongoing WTO dispute with China over the lack of IP enforcement, the
European Communities and the United States did not win all of the disputes “litigated” before the Dispute Settlement Body (Yu 2006b, 939–40).
In June 2000, for example, the United States lost its dispute with the European Communities over section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act (1976),
which enables restaurants and small establishments to play copyrighted
music without compensating copyright holders (United States—Section
110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act 2000). In a subsequent ruling, section
211(a)(2) of the US Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 (1998), which
prohibits the registration or renewal of trademarks previously abandoned
by trademark holders whose business and assets have been confiscated
under Cuban law, was found to be inconsistent with the TRIPs Agreement
(United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 2002).
In addition, the WTO panel curtailed the ability of the US administration to pursue retaliatory actions before exhausting all remedies permissible under the WTO rules, even though it nominally upheld sections
301–10 of the Trade Act of 1974 (United States—Sections 301–310 of the
Trade Act of 1974 1999). The Caribbean islands of Antigua and Barbuda
successfully challenged US laws on Internet and telephone gambling in
United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (2004). An arbitration panel subsequently determined that
“the annual level of nullification or impairment of benefits accruing to
Antigua is US$21 million” (United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services 2007).
While many of the United States’ losses before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body have come at the hand of the European Communities, the
WTO dispute settlement process is not only reserved for use by powerful
WTO member states. The last dispute has shown that, in the WTO process,
even two tiny Caribbean islands can prevail over a trading giant such as
the United States. One can imagine how effective the use of this process
can be when less developed countries team up with others as co-complainants or third parties. On the one hand, such a collective effort can
pull together scarce economic and legal resources to defend laws that
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seek to exploit the flexibilities provided by the TRIPs Agreement and
that are explicitly affirmed by paragraph 5 of the Doha Declaration. On
the other hand, less developed countries can use these resources to design
effective strategies to challenge non-TRIPs-compliant legislation in developed countries.
Compared to the uncoordinated arrangement where each country
has to file a separate complaint, or join the complainant as a third party,
the collaborative strategy has at least five benefits. First, countries will be
able to significantly reduce the costs of WTO litigation, thus lowering
the threshold for determining whether it would be worthwhile to file a
WTO complaint. Shaffer’s (2004, 473) analysis has shown how it may not
be worthwhile for a small or poor country to file a WTO complaint even
when there is a high economic stake. Based on 2004 figures, he found that
“an average WTO claim costs in the range of US $300,000–400,000 in
attorneys’ fees.” Although a potential loss of US $200,000 in trade may be
highly important to the economy of a small, poor country, such a loss
does not always justify taking the case to the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body or defending it there. Instead, these countries often give up their
valid claims (ibid., 472). If they are sued, they often settle the claims
either by abandoning legal or policy experiments that are permissible
under the WTO agreements or by transplanting laws from abroad against
their wishes and to their detriment.
Such an outcome is particularly problematic from the standpoint of the
TRIPs negotiations. One of the primary reasons why less developed countries reluctantly agreed to increase IP protection is the ability to use the
WTO dispute settlement process as a bulwark against developed countries’ coercive, and often unilateral, tactics. As some less developed countries claimed at the time of the negotiations, it would be pointless for them
to join the WTO if the United States were able to continue imposing unilateral sanctions despite their membership (Yu 2006a, 372). Unfortunately,
the high start-up costs required by the WTO dispute settlement process
have made it very difficult for less developed countries to benefit from
the hard-earned bargains they won through the WTO negotiations.
More problematically, the lack of participation by some less developed countries in the WTO dispute settlement process can hurt the protection of other less developed countries. As Shaffer (2004, 465) reminds
us, “[w]ho participates in the institutional process affects which arguments will be presented, which, in turn, affects how the competing concerns over patent protection, public health, and market competition will
be weighed.” Thus, if the WTO rules are to be shaped to advance the

Building Intellectual Property Coalitions for Development

89

interests of the less developed world, greater participation by less developed countries in the WTO dispute settlement process is needed.
Less developed countries can also benefit from the additional expertise and resources provided by other less developed countries. Instead of
spending a substantial amount of money on outside counsel or spending
even more in developing local expertise, less developed countries can
take advantage of cost-sharing arrangements and devote more resources
to improving the living standards of their nationals (ibid., 475). If these
countries team up with countries such as Brazil, China, or India, they
can benefit from even more sophisticated expertise. Since the latter are
active litigants in the WTO dispute settlement process, they have, over the
years, developed considerable expertise that can be shared with other
less developed countries.
Moreover, as repeat players in WTO litigation, less developed countries will benefit from the economies of scale in deploying legal resources
(ibid., 474). They are also more likely to possess the mindset to plan legal
strategies that will help them advance the interests of the less developed
world and strengthen their overall legal positions, rather than strategies
that seek to win only one case at a time (ibid., 470). In doing so, these
countries can use the WTO dispute settlement process effectively to shape
both the judicial interpretation and the future negotiation of the TRIPs
Agreement in a pro-development manner. They may even be able to
regain the momentum that less developed countries lost during the negotiation of the TRIPs Agreement due to their limited understanding of IP
rights and weak bargaining power. Thus far, the European Communities
and the United States have been able to advance their commercial interests through the WTO dispute settlement process because they are the predominant users of this process (ibid., 470). If less developed countries are
to curtail the ability by developed countries to advance these interests, they
therefore need to make greater strategic use of the WTO dispute settlement process.
A further benefit of this collective approach is that less developed
countries do not need to worry as much about the backlash they might
encounter should they individually file a WTO complaint against the European Communities or the United States. As William Davey (1987, 71) has
noted, when countries do not face each other often as adversaries in the
WTO process, “initiation of a complaint would be something of a slap
in the face. The ignominy of a loss would also loom larger.” By taking collective action, many otherwise infrequent players in the WTO dispute
settlement process will become more frequent players. As they become
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involved in more complaints against the European Communities or the
United States, and as each of these parties has its share of wins and losses,
the impact of a WTO dispute on diplomatic relations will be greatly reduced
(Yu 2006b, 945).
Finally, less developed countries may not “have the diplomatic or economic muscle to ensure that the decision is implemented” even if they
win their case (Davey 1987, 90). Indeed, as Davey (ibid., 102) points out,
there is a good chance that “even massive retaliation by a small country
would be unnoticed by a larger one.” Thus, by uniting together, less developed countries may be able to have more leverage at the enforcement level
by increasing the economic impact of trade countermeasures permitted
by the WTO dispute settlement panel.
Regional or Pro-Development Fora

Regional or pro-development fora are particularly effective means for
coordinating efforts by less developed countries in the areas of public
health, IP, and international trade. These fora will provide the muchneeded focal points for countries to share experience, knowledge, and
best practices and to coordinate negotiation and litigation strategies
(Musungu, Villanueva, and Blasetti 2004, xiv–xv; Narlikar 2003, 206; Shaffer 2004, 478). Through these fora, less developed countries can “(i)
raise political awareness of certain members ... (ii) help define the agenda,
prior to the actual negotiations ... and (iii) achieve particular regulatory
outcomes on a particular issue or economic sector or sub-sector ... and
defend interests in dispute settlement” (Rolland 2007, 499).
In addition, these fora allow countries to reframe issues “in a way that
eases impasses” (Odell 2006, 16), thereby providing a mechanism to balance interests internal to the group. In doing so, conflicts or negotiation
deadlocks can be resolved before the negotiations are enlarged to include
selected developed countries or the entire developed world (Rolland
2007, 501). These fora also facilitate “a pooling of organisational resources,
and enable countries with ill-defined interests to avail themselves of the
research efforts of allies and a possible country-wise division of research
and labour across issue areas” (Narlikar 2003, 14).
Through these fora, the interests of the participating countries would
be better and more symmetrically represented (Rolland 2007, 512). The
fora would also “help build capacity for the group’s members as they
would gain leverage through access to a more central and streamlined
channel of information (through the group representation) and, in turn,
be able to better formulate their own policy positions” (ibid., 512). In

Building Intellectual Property Coalitions for Development

91

addition, regional or pro-development fora could help improve the
human capital and WTO know-how of less developed countries and their
WTO-related knowledge by “better coordinat[ing] training of developing
country officials and non-governmental representatives” (Shaffer 2004,
478). These capacity-building functions are especially important, considering the fact that some less developed countries have given up their participation in international fora due to a lack of financial resources or
political circumstances.
As commentators have pointed out, many less developed countries
“lack the resources ... to send delegates to these fora and thus have resorted
to using nongovernmental organizations ... to represent their interests”
(McGinnis and Movsesian 2000, 557 n. 256). In one instance, the Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development, a London-based environmental NGO, negotiated a deal to represent Sierra
Leone before the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment (Shaffer
2001, 62–63). Even if countries are willing to send delegates, they may
have become formally inactive due to their failure to pay dues for a certain period of time. Within the WTO, for example, their inactive status
would prevent them from chairing any bodies (Narlikar 2003, 15). Many
delegations are also affected by their limited institutional capacity, delegation size, geopolitical capital, and overall expertise (Rolland 2007, 529).
Coordination at the regional level and among less developed countries becomes even more important in light of the proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements initiated by the European
Communities and the United States. Since these agreements tend to
transplant laws based on developed-country models, they are notorious
for ignoring local needs, national interests, technological capabilities,
institutional capacities, and public health conditions of less developed
countries. Even worse, these agreements sometimes call for a higher level
of protection than what is currently offered in the developed world (Correa 2004, 93; Yu 2006c, 41). If the European Communities or the United
States does not consider it beneficial to have higher protection, one has
to wonder why protection needs to be strengthened in countries that
have even more limited resources and that do not possess adequate safeguards and correction mechanisms.
If these demands for higher protection are not disturbing enough, less
developed countries may be “induced” into signing conflicting agreements with both the European Communities and the United States (Yu
2006a, 407). While these two trading powers are interested in having
strong global IP standards, there remain a large number of IP conflicts
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between the two. In the copyright context, for example, they take different positions on “the protection of moral rights, fair use, the first sale
doctrine, the work-made-for-hire arrangement, and protection against
private copying in the digital environment” (Yu 2002, 625–26). They also
approach the patent filing process differently and greatly disagree on
how to protect geographical indications (European Communities—Protection
of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs 2005). Indeed, had the United States refused to include geographical indications in the then-proposed TRIPs Agreement, the European
Communities’ initial ambivalent position toward the creation of the new
agreement might not have changed (Watal 2001, 23).
In view of these differences, conflicts may arise when less developed
countries sign the trade agreements supplied by both the European Communities and the United States without appropriate review and modification. To be certain, it is not the fault of these trading powers that policy
makers in less developed countries are unable to review or modify the
agreement. Oftentimes, it is the result of a lack of resources, expertise,
leadership, negotiation sophistication, bargaining power, or some or all
of the above. Many policy makers in less developed countries are also
blinded by the benefits that their countries may receive in other trade
areas under a package deal—or, worse, they are just too eager to appease,
or develop “friendship” with, the trading powers. Nevertheless, it is still
highly lamentable that these countries would enter into conflicting agreements that could be avoided with greater caution, coordination, and
information. It is bad enough to be forced to sign a bilateral agreement
that does not meet local conditions. It is even worse to be put into a position where one has to juggle two conflicting agreements that do not meet
local conditions and are impossible to honour.
Fortunately for less developed countries, regional or pro-development
fora may provide the much-needed institutional response to the growing
use of bilateral and regional trade agreements to push for stronger IP standards and to further reduce the policy space needed for the development
of IP, trade, and public health policies. While the constantly short-staffed
Advisory Centre on WTO Law provides legal advice and support in WTO
matters and trains government officials in WTO law, they do not provide
assistance in coordinating political, judicial, and forum-shifting strategies
in an increasingly complex international IP law-making environment (Shaffer 2004, 478). They also provide very limited assistance in developing
negotiating strategies concerning the bilateral or regional trade agreements initiated by the European Communities and the United States.
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By bringing less developed countries together, these fora would allow
policy makers in those countries to share their latest experience and lessons concerning these agreements. In doing so, the participating countries
would have more information to evaluate the benefits and drawbacks of
the potential treaties. They would also be able to anticipate problems and
potential side effects created by these treaties. They might even be able to
better design prophylactic or correction measures that would become
handy should the treaties prove to be unsuitable for their countries.
Finally, as Sonia Rolland (2007, 505) has pointed out, “the ability or
inability of developing countries to form and sustain effective coalitions
in the WTO depends not only on the coalitions’ inherent characteristics
and the political environment ... but also on the institutional and legal
framework in which they operate.” Except for supranational entities such
as the European Communities, special classifications such as least developed countries, or recognized regional trade agreements, the WTO offers
very limited support for formal representation by groups in policy deliberation. Thus, if less developed countries can use these regional or prodevelopment fora to develop strategies to push for greater legal or
structural changes within international organizations that will make group
representation easier to obtain and the institution more coalition-friendly,
they are more likely to be able to increase their bargaining leverage and
to develop a stronger voice for the less developed world. After all, “the ability to sustain developing country coalitions depends in part on the WTO’s
legal structure ... [M]embers whose interests might be more effectively
served if they are promoted by a group strategy could [also] benefit from
a legal framework that better supports developing country coalitions or
groupings” (ibid., 485).
CHALLENGES TO BUILDING IPC4D

Although collective action can play an important role in the international
IP regime and the use of the coordination strategies described in this
chapter can help less developed countries strengthen their collective bargaining position, there are still many challenges.
Historically, less developed countries have had only limited success
in using coalition-building efforts to increase their bargaining leverage
(Abbott 2003, 42). Their lack of success was perhaps caused by the fact
that these coalitions were usually too ambitious. They were set up to
include a broad mandate, diverse membership, complex issues, and
incompatible interests. As Amrita Narlikar (2003, 122–23) has shown,
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issue-based coalitions work best for small and very specialized economies
with common profiles and interests, such as those “small island economies
with similar geographic/strategic endowments, concentrated interests
in tourism exports, and travel imports.” These coalitions, however, do
not work well for larger, more diverse, and often internally conflicting
economies (ibid., 176). They also do not work well for a large bloc of less
developed countries that have various strengths, sizes, and interests and
that are only linked together in an ad hoc fashion (Rolland 2007, 510).
The lack of success by less developed countries to build or maintain
coalitions can be further attributed to their “high … dependen[ce] on
the developed countries as the source of capital, whether it is provided
through the IMF [International Monetary Fund] or World Bank, or
through investment bankers and securities exchanges” (Abbott 2003,
42). This lack of financial independence is further aggravated by a lack
of stability in the economies of less developed countries—for example,
in India during the negotiation of the TRIPs Agreement and in South
America during the negotiation (Yu 2009) of the draft International Code
of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology (1981).
Another challenge for less developed countries concerns how to set
up a coalition in a way that would prevent the more powerful members
from dominating their much weaker and more dependent partners. Since
countries with more human capital, technical knowledge, and legal expertise may abuse their leadership roles at the expense of others, it is important to build safeguards into the coalitions to protect the weaker members
and to allow them to retain their autonomy and identity. If IPC4D are to
be successfully built and maintained, it is also important to develop trust
among the participating members so that they can work together closely
without worrying about potential exploitation.
These safeguards are particularly important in light of the complex
economic interests of the larger developing countries, such as Brazil,
China, and India, all of which have grown significantly faster than their
poorer neighbours. In many areas of international trade, these middleincome developing countries already “have gained relatively more than
their poorer counterparts from the multilateral trade process [and] have
increasingly found themselves adopting positions divergent from those
of [their poorer counterparts] on the question of preferential access to
rich country markets” (Rolland 2007, 536). If history repeats itself, as in
the cases of the United States, Germany, Japan, and South Korea, some
of these countries eventually will want stronger IP protection once they
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become economically developed. They may also benefit from the continued lack of manufacturing capacity in other less developed countries.
Finally, there are “IP-irrelevant” factors—factors that are largely unaffected by IP protection (Yu 2007b, 852–53)—that would make it difficult
for countries to co-operate with each other, such as xenophobia, nationalism, racism, mistrust, and resentment. No matter how much more globalized and interdependent the world has become, some countries will
always remain reluctant to participate in these coalitions, because of historical conflicts, border disputes, economic rivalries, cultural differences,
or spillover issues from other areas.
The existence of all of these challenges, however, does not doom the
IPC4D project. Rather, it demonstrates how coalition building is always
a work in progress that requires care, vision, and continuous attention
between and among the various parties. It also suggests the importance
of using regional approaches to alleviate the impact of some of these factors. If the interests of the weaker coalition members are to be protected,
a clear and detailed coalition agreement and a carefully designed benefit-sharing arrangement need to be put in place when the coalition is set
up. It is also important for the weaker members to obtain a better understanding of how they can take advantage of the coalitions when the interests of the members are still close to each other.
CONCLUSION

There are many benefits to building IPC4D. There are some challenges,
however. If countries are to work together to develop successful coalitions, they need to clearly articulate their goals, understand each other
better, and work out mutually beneficial arrangements. In doing so, the
development of IPC4D is not a mere hope but a realistic goal. The resulting coalitions will not only be able to reduce the ongoing push by the
European Communities and the United States to ratchet up global IP
standards, but they will also help enlarge the policy space needed by less
developed countries for the development of their IP, trade, and public
health policies. With better coordination and greater leverage, these
countries may even be able to establish, shape, and enlarge a pro-development negotiating agenda that would restore the balance of the international IP system.
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NOTES
This chapter has been abridged and adapted from Peter K. Yu, “Access to Medicines, BRICS
Alliances, and Collective Action,” American Journal of Law and Medicine 34 (2008): 345–94.
1 Although the initial deadline for ratification was 1 December 2007, the deadline has
been recently extended for another two years (New 2007). As of this writing, slightly
over a quarter of the 153 WTO member states, including the United States, India,
Japan, China, and most recently members of the European Communities, have ratified
the proposed amendment (WTO 2008).
2 The TRIPs Agreement distinguishes between developing and least developed countries. This chapter uses “less developed countries” to denote both developing and least
developed countries. When referring to the TRIPs Agreement, however, the chapter
returns to the terms “developing countries” and “least developed countries.”
3 The term “regime complex” originated from Kal Raustiala and David Victor (2004).
David Leebron (2002, 18) has also advanced the concept of “conglomerate regime” to
describe this new development.
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